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THE WHY AND WHAT OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
RELIGION: Towards a New Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology for Pedagogical Practice 
Duane Williams 
Abstract: This essay seeks to question the typical approach taken 
by philosophy of religion, and offers a new one in its place. This 
new approach differs by letting the religious be heard on its own 
terms, rather than simply judging it on philosophical ones. 
Employing the thought of Martin Heidegger, it begins with an 
exploration of the word ‘why’ in philosophy according to 
Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is contrasted with 
the mystical thought of Angelus Silesius, also known as 
Johannes Scheffler. Again through Heidegger the second part 
explores the meaning of the word ‘what’ in philosophy, and 
shows how the nature of philosophy was circumscribed as 
speculative knowledge. The third part examines what it means 
to do philosophy of religion, and explains why as it stands this is 
inadequate. Finally, drawing on my own classroom practice I 
offer an arguably more fruitful phenomenological hermeneutic 
approach to philosophy of religion. 
Keywords: Gottfried Leibniz, Heraclitus, Johannes Scheffler, 
Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Hermeneutics, Philosophy 
of Religion, Principle of Reason, Subjective Representation,  
Introduction 
This essay argues that philosophy of religion tends to approach 
the religious as a subject of interrogation. Accordingly, a 
religious claim is accepted or rejected based entirely on 
speculative philosophy’s objective rational assessment. The 
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result I argue is that philosophy of religion loses sight of religion 
and is therefore inadequate. In contrast, I claim that it needs to 
approach religion as something worthy of being questioned 
rather than questionable, so that philosophy is responsibly 
answerable to religion and does not simply provide answers to 
it. 
 I develop these arguments by drawing on philosophical 
insights provided by Martin Heidegger. I divide the essay into 
four parts. The first explores the meaning of ‘why’ in philosophy 
and focuses on Heidegger’s critique of Leibniz’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, which argues that for every truth a reason can 
be given and so nothing is without a why. Heidegger contrasts 
this with a line from Johannes Scheffler’s poetry that says a rose 
is without why and blooms because it blooms. The second part 
explores what we mean by the word ‘what’ in philosophy. The 
word ‘what’ it is argued produces a delimitation in philosophy 
owing to the fact we already anticipate a preconceived answer 
by looking for an object. I show how Heidegger ventures a 
different kind of questioning or asking, that differs from the 
interrogation of an inquisitor seeking the terminal answers of 
positivistic knowledge. The third part uses these Heideggerian 
explorations into the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of philosophy to 
demonstrate that this is precisely how philosophy of religion 
approaches its subjects. I then prepare the ground for an 
alternative approach based on wider considerations. The final 
part discusses this alternative approach in the context of 
pedagogical practice, namely, aspects of my own teaching as a 
form of phenomenological hermeneutics.     
1. The ‘Why’ of Philosophy 
It is fairly well known among scholars of his work that Martin 
Heidegger explored the notion of ‘living without a why’, first 
conceived by the Christian mystical theologian, Meister Eckhart. 
Heidegger, it is said, knew that he was drawing indirectly from 
Eckhart through the mystical poet, Angelus Silesius, a 
pseudonym for Johannes Scheffler. In his poem, The Cherubinic 
Wanderer, Scheffler famously writes: “The rose is without why; it 
blooms because it blooms; it cares not for itself; asks not if it’s 
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seen.”1 Heidegger explores this line in a course of 13 lectures 
given at Freiburg in 1955-56, and later published as, The Principle 
of Ground (Der Satz vom Grund).2 The lectures focus on Leibniz’s 
famous ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’ (principium sufficientis 
rationis), that states: ‘nothing is without reason’, or as Heidegger 
translates it: ‘nothing is without ground.’ This essentially means 
that ‘for every truth, a reason can be given’, which makes the 
principle of ground, the ground of every truth.3 In his study, The 
Mystical Element of Heidegger’s Thought, John D. Caputo adds: 
“The power (Macht) of the Principle of Ground lies in the fact, 
then, that all knowledge (Erkennen), all representations, are 
subject to its demand.”4 
A crucial point here is that this unconditional demand on the 
subject to deliver a reason was, according to Heidegger, still 
being made and shaped our thinking.5 Thus under the influence 
of Leibniz’s principle, we are everywhere searching for reasons.6 
In short, ‘nothing is without a reason’, which we might translate 
as, nothing is without why. This is not simply a basic proposition, 
                                                 
1Die Ros ist ohn’ warum, sie blühet weil sie blühet, Sie acht’t nicht ihrer 
selbst, fragt nicht, ob man sie siehet. Angelus Silesius, The Cherubinic 
Wanderer, quoted from, John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in 
Heidegger’s Thought, New York: Fordham University Press, 1986, 61. 
2 Der Satz vom Grund, 3, Auflage, Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 
1965. 
3See, Caputo, The Mystical Element, 54-55. William L. Reese explains 
the Principle, saying: “For any occurrence, a being with sufficient 
knowledge would be able to explain why it is as it is and not 
otherwise.” Quoted from, William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Religion: Eastern and Western Thought, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1980, 299. 
4Caputo, The Mystical Element, 55. 
5Caputo, The Mystical Element, 57. Generally speaking I believe this 
unconditional demand is still being made today. I’m writing this essay 
because I maintain it is certainly still being made and shapes the 
thought that constitutes philosophy of religion. And this as I will come 
to argue is not appropriate or sufficient in this context. In fact it might 
be renamed the ‘Principle of Insufficient Reason.’  
6Caputo, The Mystical Element, 57. 
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says Caputo, but a decree laying claim to our thought.7 Hence 
our living in ‘the atomic age’, where we are ‘driven by a desire to 
explain and rationalize, i.e., to give grounds.’8 The answer to the 
question ‘why’ provides the grounds for this or that being so. But 
Heidegger wants to re-root what he sees as our uprootedness 
from the true ground of human existence, which for him is Being 
itself, and to lead us away from our preoccupation with this or 
that being so according to the dictates of reason. 
It is with this in mind that Heidegger turns to the line from 
Scheffler, which says: “The rose is without why; it blooms 
because it blooms; it cares not for itself; asks not if it’s seen.”9 
Where Leibniz in essence argues that ‘nothing is without why’, 
Scheffler suggests that on the contrary: ‘the rose is without why.’ 
But Heidegger is aware that reason and sound common sense 
tell us the poet is mistaken here. The botanist, for example, can 
tell us much about the why and wherefore of a rose. Responding 
to this, Heidegger says that the poet acknowledges that the rose 
has a reason or ground, and in this sense a why, but “it does not 
consider (achtet nicht) it, nor does it question (fragt nicht) it.”10 In 
short, the rose in itself is not subject to the subjectivistic principle 
of Leibniz, which demands that a reason be provided to the 
thinking subject. Thus Heidegger writes: “It is valid of the rose, 
but not for the rose; of the rose insofar as it is an object of our 
representing; but not for the rose insofar as this stands in itself 
and is simply a rose.”11 The gist of this is that the principle of 
Leibniz is true in the rationalistic terms that constitute 
‘representational’ thinking: “Every object which ‘stands 
before‘(gegen-steht) ‘consciousness’ must have a ground.”12 But 
the crucial difference identified by Heidegger is that the mystical 
                                                 
7Here I am paraphrasing Caputo, The Mystical Element, 56-7. 
8 Caputo, The Mystical Element, 57. 
9Angelus Silesius, The Cherubinic Wanderer, quoted from, Caputo, 
The Mystical Element, 61. 
10Caputo, The Mystical Element, 62. 
11Heidegger, “The Principle of Ground,” quoted from, Caputo, The 
Mystical Element, 64. 
12Caputo, The Mystical Element, 64. 
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poet “speaks of the rose not as it stands before the representing 
subject, but as it stands in itself (in sich selber steht). The poet lets 
the rose be the thing which it is, without reducing it to the status 
of an ‘object’.”13 The rose then is in a different region outside 
representational thinking where it stands on its own grounds 
and is under no demand to provide grounds for its being so, 
either to itself or to any observer. Caputo writes: 
The poet, for Heidegger, is inviting us to enter this other 
region outside representational thinking where the Principle 
of Rendering a Sufficient Ground does not hold. ... The region 
in which representational thinking is suspended will seem to 
him a strange and forbidding place.14 
For Heidegger, the demand we live under today to give grounds 
has in fact taken away the basis of our human dwelling, robbing 
us of our rootedness in the ground and soil upon which we have 
always stood – Being itself. In short, the more we have searched 
for grounds, the more groundless our lives have become.15 Thus 
Heidegger, through Scheffler’s line of mystical poetry, wants to 
return our footing to what he sees as a more genuine ground. 
Referring to this more genuine ground, Caputo notes: 
The ancient Greeks – before Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – 
knew what the mystical poet Angelus Silesius also knew – 
that things lie forth of themselves, that they emerge from out 
                                                 
13Caputo, The Mystical Element, 64. 
14Caputo, The Mystical Element, 65. Incidentally, Caputo adds that 
Laszlo Versényi, in his work, Heidegger, Being and Truth, believes this 
region to be: “an absolutely uninhabitable land in which no human 
can dwell.” See, Caputo, The Mystical Element, 65. This would be in line 
with Kantian thinking, which argues that the ‘thing-in-itself’ (dinge-an-
sich) cannot be known. This is because, as argued in Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason, things are known by us as phenomena. Asking what a 
thing-in-itself is like would be akin to asking how it appears to us 
when it does not appear to us, which is nonsensical. This is because 
Kant assumes through his ‘transcendental idealism’ that it is we who 
‘structure’ our experience through the intuition of sensibility and the 
conceptions of understanding. 
15Here I paraphrase Caputo in, The Mystical Element, 57. 
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of their own grounds, and that there is no need for the “ego” 
to “supply” grounds for them.16 
Hence Heraclitus says: “Listening to the Logos and not to me, it 
is wise to agree that all things are One.”17 Philosophy, says 
Caputo, “as a thing of reason” (eine Sache der ratio), is thus seen 
by Heidegger as the result of an oblivion.18 This is because 
philosophy does not recognise that a thing stands forth of itself 
on its own grounds, as did a more primal pre-Socratic thinking.19 
2. The ‘What’ of Philosophy 
It is a response to the sheer wonder of Being’s isness, that early 
thinking endeavoured to think upon the mystical tenet ‘All is 
one’ (Panta ta onta). George Steiner writes: “This insight is 
founded on and makes sovereignly explicit the fact that ‘all 
being is in Being. To put it more pointedly, being is Being’.”20 
Yet, this is perhaps more difficult to understand today, because 
modern thinking reduces Being to no more than the being of 
beings in general. But for Heidegger, philosophy, in its more 
genuine sense, seeks being with respect to Being. Thus 
Heidegger himself sought Being in so far as it is. He therefore 
asked the question: What is ‘is?’ To do this he had necessarily to 
begin the question with the word, what. But what is meant by the 
word ‘what’, even in this very question I am now asking? Why 
ask the question, ‘What is ‘is’?’ at all? What are we after? And 
have we already missed the isness of ‘is’ in doing so? Heidegger 
was well aware of this problem. He realized that our asking 
                                                 
16Caputo, The Mystical Element, 79. 
17Richard Geldard, Remembering Heraclitus: The Philosopher of 
Riddles, Edinburgh: Floris Books, 2000, 37. 
18Caputo, The Mystical Element, 79. 
19It might be argued that Heidegger is doing some approaches of 
philosophy a disservice here. I’m thinking, for example, of those 
elements in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics that appeal to ‘natural law.’ 
Thus Reese says of Plato that he “conceives of law as a disposition of 
reason ordering things according to their nature.” See Reese, Dictionary 
of Philosophy and Religion, 379. 
20George Steiner, Heidegger, London: Fontana Press, 1992, 25. 
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what ‘is’ is may already frame and anticipate a preconceived 
answer, owing to that which is already implied in the meaning 
of the word what in the question. For example, he writes: “In the 
Who? or the What? we are already on the lookout for something 
like a person or an object.”21  
Traditionally, the word ‘what’ concerns quiddity, that is, it 
enquires into the inherent nature or essence of something. But 
the sense of what quiddity itself is changes over time.22 
Heidegger argues that we might ask: “What is that over there in 
the distance?” The answer is given: “A tree.” But we can further 
ask: “What is that which we call a tree?”23 In so doing we 
approach the Greek ti estin (what is it?). This is the form of 
questioning, according to Heidegger, that Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle developed. With these thinkers, not only is delimitation 
sought in terms of the answer to ‘what is it?’, but also a different 
interpretation of what the ‘what’ means is given by each 
subsequent philosopher (and all philosophers thereafter). 
Heidegger is aware of these differences in asking in the same 
way ‘what is …?’, but by seeking an answer to his own question, 
‘What is philosophy?’, he specifically endeavours to uncover 
what is it is to ask what something is. In the course of doing so 
Heidegger argues that for the pre-Socratic thinker, Heraclitus, 
the word philosophia did not yet exist, rather, Heraclitus coined 
the adjective philosophos. Heidegger wants to show that the 
philosophos of Heraclitus is not the same as what will later 
become philosophia, rather the person doing the former is not a 
philosophical person (aner philosophos), but he who loves the 
sophon (hos philei to sophon). For Heidegger, the distinctive 
feature of philein, of loving, in the Heraclitean sense is a 
correspondence in accord with the sophon. This corresponding 
accordance points to ‘harmony.’24 For Heidegger the individual 
                                                 
21Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings, David 
Farrell Krell, ed., London: Routledge, 1993, 230-231. 
22See, for example, C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words, Cambridge 
University Press, 1960, 24-42. 
23 Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, Albany: NCUP, 1956, 37. 
24Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 47. 
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loves or is in harmony with the sophon. Heidegger next explores 
the word sophon, and writes: 
The sophon means, Hen Panta, ‘One (is) all.’ ‘All’ means here, 
all things that exist, the whole, the totality of being. Hen, one, 
means, the one, the unique, the all-uniting. ... all being is 
united in Being. The sophon says – all being is in Being. To put 
it more pointedly – being is Being.25 
However, over time the loving as a harmony with the sophon (i.e. 
One is all or being is Being) was altered to a different kind of 
loving. The reason for this, Heidegger argues, is because the 
Greeks had to rescue and protect Being against the attack of 
Sophist reasoning, which always had ready for everything an 
answer that was comprehensible to everyone and which they 
put on the market.26 This rescue of being in Being, says 
Heidegger, was accomplished by those who now strove for the 
sophon, and thereby kept alive the yearning of others for the 
sophon.27 Consequently the loving of the sophon as ‘harmony’ 
becomes a ‘yearning’ or ‘striving’ for the sophon. Now the sophon 
is especially sought, effecting a switch of attention from ‘all 
being is in Being’ to ‘the being in Being.’ This is because the 
loving is now no longer an original harmony with the sophon, but 
a particular striving towards it.28 Thus, this new way of loving the 
sophon becomes philosophia. Heidegger explains: 
This yearning search for the sophon, for the ‘One (is) all’, for 
the being in Being, now becomes the question, “What is 
being, in so far as it is?” Only now does thinking become 
‘philosophy.’ Heraclitus and Parmenides were not yet 
‘philosophers.’29 
As a ‘thing especially sought’, being is now ardently pursued by 
way of questioning. Philosophy now seeks what being is, in so 
far as it is. With this move the nature of philosophy was 
circumscribed. Philosophy, says Heidegger, becomes ‘episteme 
                                                 
25Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 47-49. 
26Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 51. 
27Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 51. 
28See, Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 51. 
29Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 51-53. 
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theôrêtikê (speculative knowledge).’30 This means it is a kind of 
competence that is capable of speculating, that is, “of being on 
the lookout for something and of seizing and holding in its 
glance what it is on the lookout for.”31 Even philosophy itself can 
be held in its own glance as an object of speculative knowledge. 
Thus with regard to Heidegger’s question: What is philosophy? 
Steiner writes: 
To ask in ‘philosophic’ terms – i.e. in Platonic, Aristotelian, or 
Kantian terms – “What is this thing – philosophy?” is to 
guarantee a ‘philosophic’ answer. It is to remain trapped in 
the circle of the dominant Western tradition, and this circle, in 
contrast to what Heidegger takes to be inward-circling paths 
of thinking, is sterile. We must therefore attempt a different 
sort of discourse, another kind of asking. The crucial motion 
turns on the meaning of Ent-sprechen. An Ent-sprechen is not 
‘an answer to’ ... but a ‘response to’, a ‘correspondence with’, 
a dynamic reciprocity and matching such as occur when 
gears, both in quick motion, mesh. Thus, our question as to 
the nature of philosophy calls not for an answer in the sense 
of a textbook definition or formulation, be it Platonic, 
Cartesian, or Lockeian, but for ... a response, a vital echo, a 
‘re-sponsion’ in the liturgical sense of participatory 
engagement. And this response or correspondence will 
answer to the being of Being.32  
We get a sense here of Heidegger’s attempt to return to the 
harmony with ‘all being is in Being’ rather than the yearning for 
‘the being in Being.’ Importantly, Steiner notes that the English 
phrase ‘to answer to’ captures what Heidegger is trying to 
convey. This is because it contains a sense of both ‘response’ and 
‘responsibility.’ Rather than simply give an answer to, we are 
moreover, answerable to the question of Being, as the phrase ‘to 
answer to’ implies. We must become answerable to, that is 
respond to, the call or ap-peal of Being that astonishes us with 
the existential mystery that it is, and in this way we will in turn 
                                                 
30 Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 57. 
31Heidegger, What is Philosophy?, 57. 
32Steiner, Heidegger, 29. 
18 Duane Williams 
 
Journal of Dharma 40, 4 (October-December 2015) 
become more genuinely philosophers, or rather, thinkers. This 
‘response to an appeal’ is very different from what is the 
‘demand of a decree’ in Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason.33  
For Heidegger, ‘questioning’ is not the interrogation of an 
inquisitor, but based on a ‘correspondence’ with the question of 
Being, or the Being-question (Seinsfrage). And so, rather than 
give an answer to, we are answerable to the question of Being. 
Mindful of this difference, Heidegger makes a distinction 
between the ‘questionable’ (fraglich) and the ‘worthy of being 
questioned’ (fragwürdig). The questionable is based on 
positivistic investigation and gives terminal answers that leave 
the question settled. As Steiner asserts, we do not need to ask 
again, what is the mileage to the moon or the formula for 
hydrochloric acid. He continues: “We know the answers, and the 
finality of this knowledge has, according to Heidegger, 
demonstrated the in-essentiality or, at the last, smallness of the 
original question.”34 However, that which is ‘worthy of 
questioning’, is on the contrary, inexhaustible: “There are no 
terminal answers, no last and formal decidabilities to the 
question of the meaning of human existence or of a Mozart 
sonata ... But if there can be no end to genuine questioning, the 
process is, nonetheless, not aimless.” 35 
For Heidegger, the most worthy of being questioned is Being, 
and the question of Being makes us travellers or wanderers who 
come home to the unanswerable. Throughout his career, 
Heidegger tried to think and say Being. This is a significant 
point, he tried to: “The imperative is, strictly one of attempt. 
Heidegger knows this, and says it over and over again. ‘Auf einer 
Stern zugehen, nur dieses’ (to proceed toward a star, only this). 
                                                 
33I have used the term ‘demand of a decree’ by paraphrasing 
Caputo who says: “The Principle of Ground is not just a proposition 
(Satz), not even a basic proposition (Grundsatz), but a decree (Spruch) 
which lay claim to our thought and makes a demand of us (in 
Anspruch nehmen)” Caputo, The Mystical Element, 56. 
34Steiner, Heidegger, 56. 
35Steiner, Heidegger, 56-57. 
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‘Alles ist Weg’ (all is way) or ‘under-wayness’, as in the word 
tao.36 
3. Philosophy of Religion 
My Heideggerian explorations into the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of 
philosophy have been designed to show that this is how 
philosophy tends to approach most if not all of its subjects of 
interrogation. For the concern of this essay philosophy’s subject 
of interrogation is religion, which highlights that branch of 
philosophy called, ‘philosophy of religion.’ As discussed, 
according to Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, ‘nothing is 
without a reason.’ For every truth, a reason or ground can be 
given and knowledge is subject to this principle’s demand. 
According to this thinking, to philosophically understand any 
aspects of religion under scrutiny we must explain and 
rationalize so as to give grounds for our knowledge. As a result 
religion deliberately and inevitably becomes an object of 
philosophy’s representing. This is to say that in the enterprise 
called ‘philosophy of religion’, religion is necessarily 
appropriated by philosophy. In the philosophy of religion the 
religion is subject to the philosophy, which therefore means that 
philosophy has already lost sight of religion. This, I believe, is an 
example of how philosophy as a thing of reason is a product of 
oblivion. It does not recognize that all things stand forth out of 
their own grounds. 
In philosophy of religion, religion has to satisfy philosophy 
but (and this is perhaps the essence of my argument) philosophy 
does not have to satisfy religion. The approach is solely on 
philosophy’s terms, which I would suggest seriously 
compromises the integrity of the approach. For example, in his, 
Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction, Keith E. 
Yandell says that he takes religious claims to be: “neither more 
nor less open to rational assessment than any other sorts of 
claims.”37 It becomes clear that for Yandell, ‘rational assessment’ 
                                                 
36Steiner, Heidegger, 80. 
37Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary 
Introduction, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 13. 
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is the aim of philosophy of religion because religions make 
claims. This seems to mean that for any claims to be judged as 
sound claims, they must surely be assessed rationally. In fact 
Yandell says that showing it is possible to assess religious beliefs 
rationally, is his major agenda.38 He remarks that his agenda 
runs against what he sees as the popular but false belief that 
matters of religion are private affairs. While from another angle, 
to those people who say thinking of religions as making claims is 
to misunderstand them, Yandell attributes a failure of nerve and 
unwillingness to think hard.39  
Related to the thinking hard of rational assessment (and so 
against the private) is ‘objectivity’ which, says Yandell, is rightly 
prized in philosophy as elsewhere. To be objective, he says, is: 
“To accept or reject a belief on the basis of what can be said in 
favour of, and what can be said against, its truth, no matter 
whether one prefers the belief to be true or not.”40 Here, I would 
argue, is a perfect example of philosophy appropriating religion, 
in that accepting or rejecting a religious belief is subject to 
philosophy’s rational approach to the truth. By accepting or 
rejecting the belief it does not therefore simply refer to an 
objective ‘description’ of the religion, but to an objective 
‘assessment.’ But while this admittedly avoids reducing religious 
matters to private feelings, it nevertheless subjects them to the 
notion we have discussed earlier, namely, that nothing is 
without why and for every truth a reason can be given because 
knowledge is subject to this demand. Yandell then is searching 
for reasons because nothing is without a why, and we must 
explain and rationalize in order to give grounds for belief. The 
subject of interrogation must become an object of representation 
seized by the glance of speculative knowledge rather than stand 
forth out of its own ground. In short, it must be assessed 
rationally and objectively. 
This long-held approach to doing philosophy of religion is, I 
believe, inadequate. As argued, all the while religion is subject to 
                                                 
38Yandell, Philosophy of Religion, 14. 
39Yandell, Philosophy of Religion, 14. 
40Yandell, Philosophy of Religion, 15. 
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philosophy (or philosophy done in this way) it is thereby 
appropriated and lost in the process. Whatever interpretation is 
given to the ‘why’ or ‘what’ in question, the process invariably 
seeks a rational and objective answer that in turn circumscribes 
philosophy. The name ‘philosophy of religion’ would seem to 
suggest that the philosophy is belonging to or coming from the 
religious aspect, but this is not the case. While it indirectly 
concerns or involves religion, it directly concerns or involves 
philosophy. It is philosophy about religion, and rarely philosophy 
of religion. The philosophy is not an away from and back again to 
religion. It is foremost a staying where it is in and as philosophy. 
Put another way and drawing from our earlier discussion, 
any why or what given by philosophy of religion is valid of the 
religion insofar as it is an object of our subjectivistic 
representing, but it is not valid for the religion insofar as it stands 
in itself as the religion.41 But all the time we seek philosophical 
answers by demanding that a reason is given to the thinking 
subject, we remain trapped in the circle that is the dominant 
western thinking.42 In order to participate in what I would argue 
to be a more genuine or fruitful philosophy of religion, we must 
step out of this circle and into a different region outside 
representational thinking.43 This step, I assert, would in fact 
constitute the religious. To begin with, the subject of any enquiry 
or questioning, in this case the religious, must not be subject to 
the subjectivistic principle that demands a reason is given to the 
thinking subject. We must endeavour to let the religious be the 
religious, without reducing it to the status of a subjectively 
represented object. To understand it on its own terms as 
standing forth from out of its own grounds requires us perhaps 
to become religious. By turning the religious into a subjectively 
represented object, Yandell might not be making religion a 
‘private’ affair, but he is, following the Kantian line of thought, 
making religion a necessarily ‘subjective’ affair even if this is on 
                                                 
41Here I am echoing Heidegger in the, “The Principle of Ground”, 
quoted from, Caputo, The Mystical Element, 64. 
42Here I am echoing Steiner, Heidegger, 29. 
43See Caputo, The Mystical Element, 64. 
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universal terms. Thus it is not as objective as he likes to think it 
is. This is because in terms of being rationally assessed the 
religious is ‘understood’ by us. The demand made by ourselves 
for the religious ‘to give reasons’ and in that we through 
subjective representation supply the conceptual tools for rational 
assessment, prevents our being able to dwell in the religious as 
the religious. The religious, as with Scheffler’s rose, must be 
grounded in and so blossom out of itself as a pure emerging and 
shining.44 In this way, the religious will stand in the highest 
regard not because a value has been conferred upon it, but 
because it stands forth of itself. Caputo writes of Scheffler: 
So long as one remains within ‘representational’ thinking 
there are no exceptions to the Principle of Sufficient Ground: 
every object must have a sufficient ground or reason 
delivered up for it. But the mystical poet has opened up 
access to a region where there are no ‘objects’ but only 
‘things’ (Dinge) which are left to ‘stand’ (stehen), not ‘before’ 
(gegen) a subject, but ‘in themselves’ (in sich selbe). In this 
region, grounds are neither sought after nor supplied 
because ‘things’ rest on their own grounds. In this region, 
thinking is not under the obligation or ‘demand’ to supply 
grounds at all.45 
This would mean that rather than give an answer to the religious 
we must be moreover answerable to it. The ‘loving’ aspect of our 
philosophy must be more akin to the pre-Socratic ‘harmony 
with’ than the post-Socratic ‘striving after.’ Our being answerable 
to the call or appeal of the religious contains a sense of both 
‘response’ and ‘responsibility.’ And, as stated earlier, this 
‘response to an appeal’ is very different from the ‘demand of a 
decree.’ It is not the interrogation of an inquisitor, but an 
altogether different kind of questioning based on 
correspondence or re-sponsion in the liturgical sense of 
participatory engagement.46 
                                                 
44See Heidegger, “The Principle of Ground”, quoted from, Caputo, 
The Mystical Element, 72. 
45Caputo, The Mystical Element, 65. 
46See Steiner, Heidegger, 29. 
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4. Back to the Text Itself 
This brings me to aspects of my own teaching practice where I 
have tried to involve students in a similar correspondence or re-
sponsion as a form of learning. Here the aim has been to engage 
in an arguably more genuine form of questioning or enquiry as 
an act of seeking. I say more genuine because the seeking ‘quest’ 
remains in the questioning, and does not resort to positivistic 
interrogation looking for and decided by terminal answers. 
Seeing the religious as worthy of being questioned rather than 
just questionable, the approach embraces the inexhaustibility of 
the unanswerable. In short it remains open to what is worthy of 
being questioned. And because the quest remains in the 
questioning, the students become more akin to travellers or 
wanderers as opposed to mere tourists guided on a 
predetermined route.47 And while there is no end to this genuine 
questioning and listening, the process is not aimless. In this way, 
we endeavour to step outside the circle of representational 
thinking, or what my current undergraduate students often refer 
to as their mind-set. But how might we let the religious become 
grounded in and so blossom out of itself as a pure emerging and 
shining? How do we let the religious stand in the highest regard 
not because a value has been conferred upon it, but because it 
stands forth of itself? 
In the classroom context I speak of, the aim has been to 
correspond or engage with religious texts by endeavouring to let 
them speak. And so rather than speak over the text in the form 
of answers as rational decidabilities on our own terms, we 
foremost endeavour to listen to the text speak on its own terms.48 
The quest then becomes a form of hermeneutic hearkening. As 
Heidegger writes: “... to think is before all else to listen.”49 In my 
                                                 
47This has proven so successful that a group who studied under my 
tutelage for ten years using this method, continue to meet in order to 
study texts and call themselves, the Questors. 
48 I first became familiar with this approach when a masters degree 
student under the tutelage of Dr Joseph Milne in his ‘texts seminars.’ 
49Martin Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’, On The Way To 
Language, New York: Harper Collins, 1971, 76. 
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experience as a teacher working with texts, especially religious 
texts, readers have lost the ability to listen or hearken. This is 
because they tend first to be on the lookout for what they 
already know, or seek to bring what they read into line with 
what they already know. In the process the text, rather like a 
poorly treated guest, is spoken over and so not heard. Again 
Heidegger writes: “It therefore might be helpful to us to rid 
ourselves of the habit of always hearing only what we already 
understand.”50 
An aim in my classes is to try and get students to hear 
religious texts from different traditions. This includes two texts 
from India, namely, the Bhagavad Gita and Sankara’s Crest-Jewel 
of Discrimination. Such texts are especially a challenge to hear 
when students judge them (often unwittingly) by standards that 
are western givens. For example, it is deeply entrenched in the 
western mind that reality is one thing and consciousness 
another. The student can readily accept that consciousness is of 
reality, but reality is what it is regardless of whether anyone is 
conscious of it or not. As many different subjective individuals, 
we are each separately aware of one material reality. But when 
the student begins to see that according to the above texts reality 
is ultimately identical to consciousness, and furthermore that 
this is not reality or consciousness as they typically understand 
it, then the challenge is for the student to take the text seriously 
and to go on hearing it. For some, the western given will act as a 
filter, which only lets those parts of the text through that meet 
the standard expected for philosophical credibility. That which 
does not meet this standard cannot be taken on board and thus 
taken seriously. Put another way, this means that it cannot be 
heard on its own terms and so stand forth of itself, because its 
own terms as grounds are not trusted owing to the fact that a 
negative value has been conferred upon them for simply not 
fitting what is sought. 
                                                 
50Martin Heidegger, ‘The Nature of Language’, On The Way To 
Language, 58. 
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Where this indeed happens, we might say that the student is 
successfully doing philosophy of religion. This is because the 
interrogation of the inquisitor has rationally assessed, and 
thereby provided grounds for belief or otherwise. In the process, 
the subject of interrogation has become an object of 
representation seized by the glance of speculative knowledge. 
But it has thereby been prevented from standing forth on its own 
terms and out of its own ground. Rational assessment, it seems, 
polices the border and either raises the barrier to let those things 
in that it recognizes and acknowledges, or leaves it down to keep 
the unfamiliar and unacknowledged out. But, regardless of the 
religion, because so much of the text is not recognized or 
acknowledged, it is simply not heard. Therefore, philosophy of 
religion is valid of the religion insofar as religion is an object of 
our subjectivistic representing, although even this is debateable, 
but it is not valid for the religion insofar as it stands in itself as 
the religion. Philosophy of religion has given an answer to 
religion following the demand of a decree, but has not been 
answerable to religion as a response to its appeal. This is clearly 
made worse by the fact that the philosophical framework for 
rational assessment already mistrusts and rejects much, if not 
most, of what is deemed to be religious because it is often at 
odds with its outlook.  
Where does this leave us? In order for philosophy of religion 
to become answerable to religion as a response to its appeal and 
thus correspond with it in the form of participatory engagement, 
it clearly needs to be determined, I believe, as much by the 
religion as it is the philosophy. This is to say that the philosophy, 
by virtue of corresponding with its subject matter, must become 
religious philosophy. As it tends to stand in philosophy of 
religion, religion has to satisfy the demands of philosophy 
purely as philosophized religion, whereas I am suggesting that 
the philosophy will also need to satisfy the religion as 
religionized philosophy. In the process, a philosophy of religion 
thus conceived may well allow a circumscribed philosophy to 
accord more with its pre-Socratic roots as a harmony with, in 
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contrast to the post-Socratic striving for it has undoubtedly for 
the most part become. 
In pedagogical terms according to the classroom context I 
speak of, the subtle aim is to get the students to perform a 
textual epoché with respect to the phenomenological method of 
Heidegger’s great teacher, Edmund Husserl. We therefore try to 
suspend or bracket out a ‘natural attitude’ towards the text, that 
is, set aside prejudices or assumptions and where possible in 
terms of a phenomenological hermeneutics get ‘back to the text 
itself.’ The endeavour is to hear the text on its own terms 
according to its inherent system of meaning. The meaning of the 
text becomes present to us as an ‘intentional’ object of our 
listening. And so the intentional text is our foremost concern, not 
our judgments in the form of rational assessments. But 
suspending the natural attitude in order to take an altogether 
different approach to philosophy of religion is a challenge not 
only with respect to texts but people as well, as was shown by 
my recent experience with students who prejudged and thus 
could not hear a Muslim scholar who had come to speak to them 
about Islam. Yet for religions to be heard, for dialogue to truly 
take place, and for all of us as students to learn, it is a challenge 
that I believe must be taken up and which might in the process 
transform philosophy of religion. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has put forward a critique of the subjectivistic 
approach taken by philosophy of religion and has endeavoured 
to provide an alternative rendering of this discipline. This I have 
argued is necessary because the religious is appropriated and 
therefore overlooked by the philosophical, which explains and 
rationalises in order to make the religious an object of its 
representing. That everything is on philosophy’s terms makes 
philosophy of religion an inadequate discipline with respect to 
understanding the religious. The demand by philosophy I have 
argued is valid of the religion insofar as it is an object of our 
representing, but not for the religion insofar as it stands in itself. I 
have therefore proposed a change of attitude that lets something 
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stand forth in itself, and I would further argue that this change 
of attitude is precisely what constitutes the religious. This is 
because a thing in itself is in a different region outside 
representational thinking where it stands on its own ground, 
and is in this very respect the religious as the religious. 
Accordingly, it is under no demand to provide grounds for its 
being so either to itself or an observer. This further tells us that 
the ego does not supply grounds for the religious. On the 
contrary, the ego may come to realise that it was groundless 
before this more genuine ground came to be. 
 I have also argued that to ask philosophically about the 
religious is to guarantee a philosophical answer, never a 
religious one. I have therefore suggested a different approach to 
philosophy of religion’s questioning, where philosophy becomes 
answerable to the religious which is worthy of being questioned, 
so that the religious is not simply questionable in order to seek 
an answer to it. The aim I propose is not to arrive at definitions 
or formulations, but to proceed towards a responsive 
participatory engagement that brings exegetes home to the 
unanswerable because it is inexhaustible. I believe it is important 
for philosophy to see that religious claims are more genuinely 
understood when interpreted religiously, rather than being 
accepted or rejected only when assessed rationally. This I believe 
also returns us to a more genuine and extensive sense of 
philosophy, not circumscribed by reason and objectivity. 
 The responsive participatory engagement I suggest is best 
approached through a method of phenomenological 
hermeneutics in which students attempt to hear the text 
speaking, rather than speaking over the text and only hearing 
what they already understand. Therefore, it is the text teaching 
them while the tutor attempts to facilitate interpretation. 
Accordingly, the text is more able to stand on its own terms and 
speak forth from out of its own ground. This is because the text’s 
speaking is determined by the religious, and the religious 
determined by the text speaking, not by speculative philosophy. 
Finally, I have endeavoured to argue that textual reading (or an 
encounter with a lived religion) as a hermeneutic hearkening 
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becomes a more genuine philosophy of religion when it is 
religious philosophy. 
 
  
